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MORE HOMESTEAD PROTECTION AND
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HOMEOWNERS?: EXAMINING THE EXPANDED
COVERAGE UNDER AN ACT RELATIVE TO THE
ESTATE OF HOMESTEAD
ATTORNEY JUSTIN H. DION; ATTORNEY KATHLEEN E. DION AND
JESSICA MORRIS*
ABSTRACT
A Declaration of Homestead is a powerful law that protects a
homeowner’s equity in real estate and provides a financial shield to
ward off potential creditor claims. Although initially drafted with good
intentions, the Massachusetts homestead law was revised and modified
over several decades, producing confusing and inconsistent
interpretations. To complicate matters, due to the fact creditor-debtor
disputes often end up in United States Bankruptcy Court, federal
bankruptcy judges were often forced to make sense of the patchwork that
comprised the Massachusetts state homestead law, and often produced
outcomes that seemed inconsistent with the objective of protecting home
equity. After years of complaints from practitioners, creditors, and
homeowners, in 2011, the Massachusetts legislature completely
overhauled the Homestead Act as they tried to simplify the law and close
any loopholes that had been exploited in the prior Act.
After exploring the background and philosophy of homestead laws
*

Attorney Justin Dion is a professor at Bay Path College in Longmeadow,
Massachusetts, where he is the Director of the Bay Path College Bankruptcy Clinic. He is
also an adjunct professor at Western New England University School of Law in Springfield,
Massachusetts. In addition to teaching, Attorney Dion is associated with the Springfield law
firm Bacon Wilson P.C., where he practices bankruptcy law. A frequent lecturer on
bankruptcy issues and active member of the bar, Attorney Dion can be contacted at
jdion@baypath.edu.
Attorney Kathleen Dion is an associate at Robinson & Cole LLP in Hartford,
Connecticut, where she practices in the litigation section. Before practicing law, she was a
law clerk for the Honorable Robert E. Beach of the Connecticut Appellate Court. Attorney
Dion can be contacted at kdion@rc.com. The contents of this article do not represent the
views of Robinson & Cole LLP.
Ms. Morris holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Legal Studies from Bay Path College in
Longmeadow, Massachusetts.
99

DION FINAL 51313.DOC

100

5/15/13 2:43 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:99

nationally, this Article explores the problems with the old Massachusetts
Act, followed by a detailed analysis of the new Act to examine how the
problems were addressed. The authors conclude that although the new
Massachusetts Homestead Act better accomplishes the intent of a
homestead law, some of the language chosen by the Massachusetts
legislature will continue to cause interpretation problems that may
produce inconsistent results and new frustrations.
INTRODUCTION
“The creditor hath a better memory than the debtor.”
James Howell
Like many terms, the word homestead has dual meanings.
Although the common meaning of homestead refers to “[t]he house,
outbuildings, and adjoining land owned and occupied by a person or
family as a residence,”1 the legal use often refers not to the estate, but
rather the ability to exempt (or keep) a debtor’s home away from
creditors. Black’s Law Dictionary defines homestead law as “[a] statute
exempting a homestead from execution or judicial sale for debt . . . .”2
In short, homestead statutes act as shields, and are designed to prevent a
family’s home from being taken by certain creditors. Although arguably
unfair to creditors who could otherwise recoup their debt by selling the
home of landowning debtors, the state’s interest in preventing
homelessness (and in turn preventing the state from having to care for
homeless families) trumps the interests of creditors. However, a
homestead only protects a debtor’s “home,” and thus any secondary real
property is not exempt and could otherwise be taken to satisfy debts.3 It
is important to note that homestead statutes are generally limited to
protecting homeowners from involuntary creditors, such as judgment
creditors, attachments, and involuntary liens, and therefore a homestead
does not provide protection from non-payment of voluntary liens (such
as mortgages) and taxes.4
The homestead exemption has been described as an “American
innovation.”5 Texas was the first state to provide a homestead

1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 802 (9th ed. 2009).
2. Id.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2006).
4. Julia Patterson Forrester, Home Equity Loans in Texas: Maintaining the Texas
Tradition of Homestead Protection, 55 SMU L. REV. 157, 159 (2002).
5. Julie B. Schroeder, Comment, Perspectives on Urban Homestead Exemptions—
Texas Amends Article XVI, Section 51, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 603, 606-07 (1984).
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exemption.6 Most states followed the example of Texas and had
homestead exemptions by the end of the nineteenth century.7 “The
principle reason behind its enactment in the states was to provide for the
debtor and, more importantly, for his family, an asylum from creditors in
the wake of the financial turmoil of the 1830’s [sic].”8 In addition, the
homestead is a creature of state law, with some states lacking any
homestead protection, and other states protecting an unlimited dollar
amount in a homestead.9 Against a backdrop of various state homestead
exemptions, Congress addressed federal bankruptcy homestead
exemptions in § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code).10
The Constitution gives Congress the power to create uniform
bankruptcy laws.11 According to § 541(a)(1) of the Code, the filing of a
bankruptcy creates an estate that includes “all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”12 This
broadly inclusive provision is narrowed by exemptions the debtor is
permitted to claim under § 522(b).13 Real and personal property that are
properly exempted can be retained by the debtor after the bankruptcy
process is concluded.14 Although “the Bankruptcy Code is a federal
statute, it might be expected that it would be applied in a more or less
uniform manner throughout the nation,” however, “in practice, consumer
bankruptcy varies significantly from state to state.”15 The debtor must

6. Id. at 607. Texas included a homestead exemption in its 1845 Constitution. See
Forrester, supra note 4, at 159.
7. See Forrester, supra note 4, at 159. “The ten Southern states passed their first
homestead exemption laws in the following years: Texas in 1839; Georgia in 1841;
Mississippi in 1841; Alabama in 1843; Florida in 1845; South Carolina in 1851 (repealed
seven years later); Louisiana in 1852; Tennessee in 1852; Arkansas in 1852; and North
Carolina in 1859. The remaining four states—Missouri, West Virginia, Kentucky, and
Virginia—did not pass their first laws until 1863, 1864, 1866, and 1867, respectively.” Alison
D. Morantz, There’s No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption and Judicial Constructions
of Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 245, 253 n.24 (2006).
8. Schroeder, supra note 5, at 607.
9. For example, compare New Jersey in which no homestead exemption is provided
with Florida, which does not place a limit on the dollar amount of the homestead exemption.
Compare N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 17-17 (West, Westlaw 2012), with FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2006).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006); see also CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY § 5.10, at 305 (1997).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2006).
14. George M. Prescott Jr., Amphisbaena! How 11 U.S.C. 522(c) Expands and
Contracts State-Law Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 435, 437
(2001).
15. See Daniel A. Austin, State Laws, Court Splits, Local Practice Make Consumer
Bankruptcy Anything but “Uniform,” 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2011).
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choose between the federal homestead exemptions found in § 522(d), or
the homestead exemptions allowed in their state.16 Due to lack of
clarity, the Massachusetts Homestead Act has been a constant source of
frustration for homeowners, lawyers, and judges, especially in
bankruptcy court, where most homestead issues seem to play out.
Pursuant to the Code, a debtor filing bankruptcy in Massachusetts
can either choose to use the Massachusetts exemptions in order to retain
his or her property, or a debtor can choose to use the federal
exemptions.17 In the case of a debtor who owns real estate in
Massachusetts which is used as a home, the debtor may be inclined to
use the Massachusetts exemptions in order to protect the equity in his or
her home as it provides up to $500,000 in protection,18 as opposed to
federal bankruptcy exemptions, which limit the home’s equity to
$20,200.19 Accordingly, due to the dramatic increase in home equity
that can be protected by utilizing the Massachusetts Homestead Act,
most bankruptcy debtors who own real estate with equity claim state
exemptions. Thus, the United States Bankruptcy Court (Bankruptcy
Court) has unwillingly become the primary interpreter of the
Massachusetts Homestead Act, and ultimately has to determine overall
homestead validity. If the homestead is valid, the home is retained by
the debtor. If the homestead is not valid, the bankruptcy trustee for the
benefit of creditors may sell the home. This has resulted in numerous
bankruptcy decisions that have validated (or invalidated) homestead
validity, and at times produced inconsistent and illogical results based on
16. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2006). See also In re Garran, 338 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003).
17. This is known as the “opt out.” See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2006).
18. In 2005, Congress capped previously unlimited exemptions in real property
acquired within 1,215 days of the debtor filing bankruptcy. See Anthony C. Coveny,
Comment, Saying Goodbye to Texas’s Homestead Protection: One Step Toward Economic
Efficiency with the Bankruptcy Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 44 HOUS. L.
REV. 433, 464 n.242 (2007). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1), one’s ability to receive the
full benefit of the Massachusetts homestead is capped at $125,000 if the debtor has owned the
home for fewer than 1,215 days. Specifically, the Code states in part as follows:
(p)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and sections 544 and
548, as a result of electing under subsection (b)(3)(A) to exempt property under
State or local law, a debtor may not exempt any amount of interest that was acquired
by the debtor during the 1215-day period preceding the date of the filing of the
petition that exceeds in the aggregate $125,000 in value in –
(A) real or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence;
(B) a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor
uses as a residence;
(C) a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) (2006); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2006).
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an outdated and confusing statute. The Massachusetts state legislature
finally responded to the overwhelming complaints of litigants, lawyers,
and judges in regard to interpretation inconsistencies by recently
amending the Homestead statute.20 Now the question is whether the new
statute fixes the problems and inconsistencies that developed under the
old statute.
I.

SURVEY OF GENERAL HOMESTEAD LAWS THROUGHOUT THE
UNITED STATES

As homestead protection is a creature of state law, the acquisition
and protections vary from state to state and can be evaluated by
reviewing several factors. First, does the state have any homestead
protection at all? Although most states have some degree of homestead
protection, several do not. Second, how is the homestead created?
Some states automatically bestow homestead protection upon all
homeowners, whereas others require the homeowner take an overt act in
order to obtain the homestead protection—such as Massachusetts, where
it was necessary to record a signed and notarized Declaration of
Homestead in the Registry of Deeds.21 Third, how much home equity
can be protected by the homestead? Many states place a dollar limit on
the amount of equity that a homeowner can protect with a homestead;
however, a few states do not limit the dollar amount that can be
protected.22 In addition, some states further vary the homestead dollar
amount based on family size, age, and/or disability. Finally, some states
vary the level of protection based on the geographic size encompassed in
the home. For example, can a 500-acre parcel with a single home be
fully protected from creditors via homestead? In addition to limiting the
dollar amount of the homestead, some states also limit the geographic
size, i.e., acreage, of the homestead.23

20. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011).
21. See id. §§ 1, 5.
22. See Leigh J. Francis, Calling All Debtors, Want to Defraud Your Creditors? Here is
How: The Tenancy by the Entirety Loophole and the Nullification of Section 522(o), (p), and
(q) of the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 n.7 (2010). “Texas,
Florida, Iowa, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, and the District of Columbia have adopted some
form of unlimited homestead exemptions.” Id. at 12. Texas cited three major public policy
rationales for the homestead exemption: (1) the protection of debtors; (2) the protection of
women; and (3) fostering the spirit of settler's independence. Other courts have commented
that the “object of all homestead legislation is to protect the home, to furnish shelter for the
family, and to promote the interest and welfare of society . . . .”
Id.
23. See infra Appendix.
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II. MASSACHUSETTS HOMESTEAD—ISSUES AND CASE LAW UNDER
THE OLD HOMESTEAD LAW
Prior to the legislative overhaul, the Massachusetts homestead
statute was a “Frankenstein Statute” as it was comprised of parts dating
back over 150 years, and contained a patchwork of amendments and
inconsistent revisions. In Massachusetts, the homestead statute is
codified in chapter 188, section 1 of the Massachusetts General Laws
and is stated in part as follows:
Section 1. An estate of homestead to the extent of $500,000 in the
land and buildings may be acquired pursuant to this chapter by an
owner or owners of a home or one or all who rightfully possess the
premise by lease or otherwise and who occupy or intend to occupy
said home as a principal residence. Said estate shall be exempt from
the laws of conveyance, descent, devise, attachment, levy on
execution and sale for payment of debts or legacies except in the
following cases:
(1) sale for taxes;
(2) for a debt contracted prior to the acquisition of said estate of
homestead;
(3) for a debt contracted for the purchase of said home;
(4) upon an execution issued from the probate court to enforce its
judgment that a spouse pay a certain amount weekly or otherwise for
the support of a spouse or minor children;
(5) where buildings on land not owned by the owner of a homestead
estate are attached, levied upon or sold for the ground rent of the lot
whereon they stand;
(6) upon an execution issued from a court of competent jurisdiction
to enforce its judgment based upon fraud, mistake, duress, undue
24
influence or lack of capacity.

24. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2004) (amended 2011). In Tewhey v. Bodkins, the
court held:
A judgment that is “based upon” fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence or
lack of capacity is the type of judgment that is an exception to the homestead
exemption. The plain meaning of “based upon” is that the judgment is “rooted in”
or is as a result of any one of the descriptive words in the statute. Cf., Smith v.
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 31, 33 (2006) (interpreting “based
upon” in another statute). In the present case, the default judgment against Tewhey
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Prior to the recent homestead amendment, entitlement to a
homestead exemption was not automatic, as an owner of a home was
required to file the necessary Declaration of Homestead form in the
correct Registry of Deeds office before an exemption came into
existence.25 Only one member of a family was permitted to file a
Declaration under section 1, however, the single filing by any member
of a family protected all members of that family.26 A second type of
Massachusetts homestead exemption that could be recorded was only
available to elderly or disabled persons.27 According to Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 188, section 1A, “[t]he real property or
manufactured home of . . . a disabled person, as herein defined, shall be
protected against attachment, seizure or execution of judgment to the
extent of $500,000.”28 A Declaration of Homestead under this section
only provided protection to individuals who filed a Declaration, and a
filing by one member of a family under section 1A would not protect the
non-filing members of that family.29
In addition, the language of both sections 1 and 1A indicated that
homestead protection did not apply to debts existing before recording the
homestead.30 Therefore, one would believe it was important to file a
homestead as early as possible. However, one of the early Bankruptcy
Court cases contributing to statutory confusion held that despite
is “based upon” his neglect with respect to answering the complaint and his
“knowing and wilful” [sic] malpractice in violation of c. 93A.
No case from a Massachusetts court has been found that addresses the “fraud,
mistake, duress undue influence or lack of capacity” exception to homestead
protection under G.L. c. 188, § 3(b)(6). The Court is aware of the decision by the
United States District Court (Gorton, J.), in ClearOne Communications, Inc. v.
Chiang, 717 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Mass. 2010) concluding that § 3(b)(6) is
“ambiguous” and holding that it does not create an exception to a homestead
exemption for a judgment based upon misappropriation and theft of trade secrets.
The court respectfully declines to follow the reasoning of that decision. To do so
would, essentially, read out of existence § 3(b)(6). Instead, that section must be
given meaning. If a judgment (upon which an execution is obtained to enforce) is
based upon one of the descriptive terms in § 3(b)(6), the execution should be an
exception to the homestead exemption.
No. 2011-01506, 2012 WL 1390180, at *3 (Super. Ct. Mass. Jan. 6, 2012).
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 2 (2010) (amended 2011).
26. Id. § 1; see also In re Garran, 338 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2003).
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1A (2004) (repealed 2011).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2004) (amended 2011) (“Said estate shall be
exempt from the . . . payment of debts . . . except . . . for a debt contracted prior to the
acquisition of said estate of homestead . . . .”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1A (2004)
(repealed 2011) (“The following shall be exempt from the provisions of this section . . . any
and all debts . . . existing prior to the filing of the declaration . . . .”).
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seemingly clear language, under federal bankruptcy law, the application
of the Massachusetts homestead statute did provide protection from preexisting creditors.31 In sum, the court found that federal bankruptcy law
pre-empted state law, and thus debts incurred years prior to the filing of
the homestead would be unable to gain access to the home equity even if
the homestead was filed only minutes before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.32
Although homestead statutory language appears deceptively
straightforward, a bankruptcy trustee, representing the interests of the
creditors, is motivated to challenge the nuances of the homestead statute
patchwork. If a particular individual’s homestead is determined by the
Bankruptcy Court to be invalid, the trustee is able to liquidate that
debtor’s real estate and ultimately make a distribution to creditors.
Although a homestead is a product of the state legislature, ironically the
determination of validity often falls on federal bankruptcy judges who
are asked to rule based on how the highest court in the state would
hypothetically determine validity.33 In Massachusetts, the Supreme
Judicial Court (SJC) has instructed that while the homestead statute must
be read literally, it also should be liberally construed in favor of the
debtor, and the court must follow the plain language of the statute unless
doing so would lead to an absurd result.34 This direction from the SJC
has caused widespread frustration. In fact, in one case, United States
Bankruptcy Court Judge Henry J. Boroff openly expressed his
interpretation frustration when he included dicta in an opinion regarding
a homestead issue. Specifically, he wrote:
This Court feels compelled to express at the onset its growing
frustration with the application of the Massachusetts Homestead
Statute. While it is well settled that the statute’s purpose is to protect
the family home . . . the statute’s ambiguities have proven to be
legion and its benefits 1) appear to be available only for those with

31. In re Leicht, 222 B.R. 670, 679 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998); see also Prescott Jr., supra
note 14, at 435.
32. See In re Whalen-Griffin, 206 B.R. 277, 291-92 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (ruling that
the federal bankruptcy laws preempted Massachusetts homestead exemptions and the effect is
to protect homesteads from liens, even where debts are incurred prior to homestead
recording); see also In re Weinstein, 217 B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (expanding the
decision in Whalen-Griffin to include both unsecured and secured pre-homestead debt under
bankruptcy protection). Contra Walsh v. Yarossi, No. 309135, 2006 WL 3493476, at *4
(Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 5, 2006) (finding that a prejudgment attachment filed before a
homestead declaration is a valid preexisting lien, negating the homestead protection, even
when the judgment is obtained after the homestead).
33. See In re Garran, 338 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003).
34. Shamban v. Masidlover, 705 N.E.2d 1136, 1138-39 (Mass. 1999).
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the legal training or resources necessary to locate a registry of deeds
and record what is, for a layperson, a relatively complex document,
and 2) may be easily and inadvertently lost by statutory language
35
and conditions that are hyper-technical and often counterintuitive.

As this article focuses solely on the Massachusetts homestead
statute, some examples of the homestead issues faced by the
Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court before the amendment was enacted
follow. After this discussion, the language of the new homestead statute
will be examined to determine if the issues raised by the below case law
were adequately addressed or modified by the Massachusetts legislature.
A. The Problem of Inadvertent Homestead Termination and Lack of
Automatic Coverage
Due to ambiguities, the old homestead statute was unclear on
precisely when a homestead would be terminated by conveyance, at
times resulting in strange and unintended results. For example, in In re
Hildebrandt, the chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee objected to the homestead
exemption claimed by the debtor based on the theory that the homestead
estate had been terminated when property was conveyed from
Hildebrandt and his female cohabitant as tenants in common to
Hildebrandt as sole owner without an express reservation of homestead
estate.36 Specifically, in 2000, Hildebrandt and Ann Renaud purchased
real estate located in Southwick, Massachusetts, as tenants in common.37
Hildebrandt subsequently recorded a Declaration of Homestead for the
property pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 188, section
1.38 Three years later, Hildebrandt and Renaud terminated the tenancy in
common by jointly deeding the property to Hildebrandt as sole owner.39
Hildebrandt recorded the new deed in 2003, but he did not specifically
reserve a homestead estate, as he assumed his previously recorded
homestead would continue to protect his ownership.40 The issue was
whether the debtor terminated his homestead by conveying jointly
owned property to just himself without reserving or recording a new
homestead.41 As his ownership remained constant, he claimed his

35.
omitted).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

In re Edward R. Szwyd, 346 B.R. 290, 291 n.1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (citations
In re Hildebrandt, 320 B.R. 40, 42 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
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homestead was never terminated, as was his obvious intent.42
In analyzing the issue, the court noted that under section 2, the plain
language of the statute indicated that a homestead could be terminated
by either a deed of conveyance, which did not specifically reserve an
estate of homestead, or by release.43 The Bankruptcy Court held that
despite the debtor’s probable intent to retain protection, under the “plain
meaning” rule, the SJC would hold that the homestead estate terminated
if homestead property is “conveyed” without specific reservation of
homestead.44 This holding is significant as it demonstrates a clear defect
in the statutory drafting. Specifically, common sense dictates that
someone owning a home jointly with homestead protection would not
want that protection terminated simply because the co-owner gives up
his or her interest. If the intent of the homestead statute is to protect
someone’s home from creditors and to prevent homelessness, the
Hildebrandt case produces a contrary result. In addition, if the
homestead statute had included a provision allowing for automatic
protection, the debtor’s home would have remained protected.
B. Uncertainty Regarding the Extent of the Homestead Coverage When
the Home is Sold
Does the homestead coverage only protect the physical home, or
does it protect the equity in the home even after it is sold? The court
struggled with this issue in In re Cunningham.45 Following a
complicated factual history, Cunningham sold his home, which had been
subject to a valid homestead exemption.46 Despite a challenge by a
creditor, the court held that the homestead exemption applied to the sale
proceeds, and could not be acquired by creditors.47 Following a survey,
the court noted that a majority of courts hold that a change in the
character of property otherwise claimed as exempt will not change the
42. Id.
43. Id. at 43-44.
An estate of homestead created under section two may be terminated during the
lifetime of the owner by either of the following methods: (1) a deed conveying the
property in which an estate of homestead exists, signed by the owner and owner’s
spouse, if any, which does not specifically reserve said estate of homestead; or by
(2) a release of the estate of homestead, duly signed, sealed and acknowledged by
the owner and the owner’s spouse, if any, and recorded in the registry of deeds for
the county or district in which the property is located.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 7 (2010) (amended 2011).
44. In re Hildebrandt, 320 B.R. at 44-45.
45. In re Cunningham, 354 B.R. 547 (D. Mass. 2006).
46. Id. at 548.
47. Id.
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status of that property.48 The court relied on the principle that once
property is exempt, it is exempt forever and nothing occurring postpetition can change that fact.49 This is because § 522(c) “essentially
‘immunizes’ exempt property against any liability for prepetition debts.
This immunization continues even after the bankruptcy case is closed.”50
The court also noted that “[n]othing in section 522(c) even vaguely
suggests that, as a precondition to enjoying the protections of that
provision, the debtor must maintain the exempt character of the
property.” 51 This decision is important because, for the first time, the
court broadly increased the homestead protection by expanding coverage
beyond the simple metes and bounds of the home, to also protect the
cash value and financial equity in the home.
C.

Is a Homestead Subordinate to a Mortgage?

Another ambiguity in the homestead statute lead a homeowner to
challenge a foreclosure attempt by a bank based on the protections
granted by his homestead.52 The court ultimately had to determine if the
mortgage was subordinate to the homestead when not expressly stated in
the mortgage.53 Specifically, in In re Desroches, the debtors owned a
single family home in Chicopee, Massachusetts as tenants by the
entirety, subject to a first mortgage.54 In February 2000, the debtors
filed a Declaration of Homestead, and later took out a second
mortgage.55 Upon the foreclosure by the second mortgagor, the debtors
argued that the bank took the second mortgage subject to the homestead,
and thus the homestead remained valid and was never terminated by the
execution of the mortgage because of the “obvious legislative purpose”
of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 188.56 Specifically, the debtors
argued that according to the plain and unambiguous language of section
6, if the mortgage did not contain a specific release of the previously
recorded homestead, the mortgage was subordinate to the homestead,
regardless of Massachusetts’s common law title theory. 57
48. Id. at 554-55.
49. Id. at 554.
50. Id. (quoting In re Reed, 184 B.R. 733, 738 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995)).
51. Id. at 544 (citing In re Reed, 184 B.R. at 737-38).
52. See In re Desroches, 314 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 21.
57. Id.
In a “title theory” jurisdiction a mortgage is viewed as a form of title to property. A
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The court held that because the mortgage was the standard
mortgage form and “contain[ed] words of grant and the term ‘with
mortgage covenants’ . . . it served the statutory purpose of ‘conveying
the property’ for purposes of triggering the release provision of § 7.”58
Thus, although the homestead statute was unclear, the court held that the
SJC, if asked, would rule that a standard mortgage form contains
adequate language to subordinate the homestead as to the lender, but not
as to other involuntary lienholders.59 In sum, although not completely
clear, a previously recorded homestead does not shield a homeowner
from a mortgage foreclosure.
D. Homestead Stacking—Can More Than One Homestead Be Claimed
on a Single Home?
The previous homestead law was unclear on the notion of adding
multiple owners’ homestead values together, known as stacking—
especially when applied to a married couple when one spouse was
entitled to an elderly or disabled homestead under Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 188, section 1A, and the other spouse was not. In
In re Garran, David and Judith Garran owned a single-family home in
Hingham, Massachusetts, as tenants by the entirety.60 In February 1996,
David executed and delivered a promissory note for $50,000 to the
United States Trust Company, and three years later, Garran executed a
second promissory note to the same bank.61 In August 2000, the owner
of the notes commenced an action against David in the Superior Court
after he defaulted.62 The bank then obtained a writ of attachment against
the property.63 David recorded a Declaration of Homestead on the
property as a disabled person pursuant to section 1A, and his wife Judith

“mortgage” is a conveyance of title to property that is given as security for the
payment of a debt and more. Specifically, a mortgage is often considered a
condition of conveyance vesting the legal title in the mortgagee.
Carole Necole Brown and Serena M. Williams, Rethinking Adverse Possession: An Essay on
Ownership and Possession, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583, 585 n.13 (2010) (citing 54A AM. JUR.
2D Mortgages § 1 (2009)).
58. In re Desroches, 314 B.R. at 23 (citing Milton Savings Bank v. United States, 187
N.E.2d 379, 381 (Mass. 1963)) (holding that upon execution of the mortgage, the mortgagor
retains only “an equity of redemption accompanied by a right to possession”); Harlow Realty
Co. v. Cotter, 187 N.E. 118, 119 (Mass. 1933) (holding that the “mortgagee named in the
mortgage [at the time of the mortgage’s execution] acquired the legal title” to the property).
59. In re Desroches, 314 B.R. at 23.
60. In re Garran, 338 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2003).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id.
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later recorded a Declaration of Homestead on the same property
pursuant to section 1.64 Thereafter, David filed a chapter 7 petition for
bankruptcy, and on his petition he listed the property as having a value
of $560,000.65 He also claimed the property as exempt pursuant to his
section 1A exemption for $300,000, and his wife’s section 1 exemption
for $300,000, thereby seeking to exempt the whole value of the home.66
David argued that the exemptions should be stacked, “because the
purpose of enacting § 1A was to provide additional protection” for
disabled debtors.67 After analyzing the issue, the court found that prior
to the 2000 amendments to the homestead statutes, sections 1 and 1A
provided different levels of exemptions in that the section 1 general
homestead exemption provided protection up to $100,000, while the
section 1A exemption provided a $200,000 exemption.68 Subsequently,
the 2000 amendments raised the monetary value and equalized the
sections 1 and 1A exemptions.69 As such, the court then explained that
even absent stacking, section 1A still provides protections unavailable
under section 1.70 Under section 1A, a debtor retains his homestead
exemption even after a judgment against him based on fraud, mistake,
duress, undue influence or lack of capacity, while under section 1, the
debtor does not.71 The court thus rejected Garran’s interpretation of the
homestead statutes because it concluded that denying a debtor the ability
to stack exemptions does not eliminate the value of the section 1A
enactment.72
Finally, although the statute was silent on this issue, the court
predicted that given the opportunity, the SJC would conclude that the
plain language of the homestead statutes prohibits the stacking of the
exemptions, and thus, David was entitled only to a maximum of
$300,000 provided by his non-debtor spouse’s Declaration of
Homestead under section 1.73

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E. The Mobile Home Problem
Although most people envision home ownership as involving real
property, reality differs as thousands of Massachusetts’s residents call a
mobile park their home. A mobile home differs from a traditional house
in that generally, mobile homeowners purchase the physical structure of
the house, but lease the land on which it rests. In addition, although
technically possessing mobility in the form of wheels, most mobile
homes remain stationary during their existence.
Should these
differences invalidate homestead protection? Based on the intent of the
statute, it would appear that the homestead would protect a debtor’s
residence regardless of what type of structure it is (house versus mobile
home); however, the old statute strangely differentiated the protection of
mobile homes based on whether the resident was elderly or disabled.74
This ambiguity was examined in the In re Kelly case.
In Kelly, the debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in which
he disclosed an interest in a trailer and claimed an exemption for that
mobile home under section 1A.75 The chapter 7 trustee objected to the
exemption because the debtor filed the homestead under section 1, not
section 1A.76 The trustee further argued that the debtor could not claim
an exemption under section 1A, because he met neither the age nor the
disability requirements of section 1A.77 The debtor claimed that the “A”
listed after his section 1 exemption was a typographical error and, thus,
moved to amend his petition.78 He also argued that he was entitled to an
exemption for the trailer because section 1 permits the owner or owners
of a “home” to acquire a homestead exemption for a manufactured
home.79 The trustee argued that a trailer is not included within the
meaning of “home” as described in section 1.80
The court concluded that section 1 did not permit an exemption for
a trailer.81 The court found most persuasive the fact that section 1A did
provide a homestead exemption for mobile homes. The court noted that
the statute had been amended in 1990 and 1991 to permit an exemption
for manufactured homes under section 1A.82 This was important

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 188, § 1A (2004) (repealed 2011).
In re Kelly, 334 B.R. 772, 772-73 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
Id. at 773.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 776.
Id.
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because the court concluded that, pursuant to Massachusetts law, the
omission of “manufactured housing” from section 1 was intentional and
the exemption was denied.83 Contrary to common sense, this holding
divests those Massachusetts residents who reside in mobile homes of
homestead protection.
F.

Does the Homestead Apply to a Property Held in Trust?

As the prevalence of real estate trusts continues to increase as a
method of estate planning, a serious issue arises regarding the existence
of homestead protection. Specifically, it was unclear under the old
statute whether the homestead provided protection for those
homeowners who put their house into a trust for estate planning
purposes.
In In re Rodrigues, the debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy and
owned real property in South Dartmouth, Massachusetts.84 The
bankruptcy trustee objected to the homestead exemption because the
debtor had executed it in her capacity as trustee of the Olga M.
Rodrigues Living Trust.85 Subsequently, the debtor also individually
executed a Declaration of Homestead.86 The trustee argued that the
debtor could not “claim a Massachusetts homestead exemption on real
estate held in trust, unless the trust is in name only and is collapsible,
thus vesting legal and equitable title in one person.”87
After reviewing the case, the court held that the debtor, in her
capacity as trustee, granted herself rightful possession of the property
and intended to occupy it as her principal residence, and thus she did not
need to execute a lease with herself to authorize rightful possession.88
Although the debtor may not have successfully revoked the trust, the
record contains evidence in the form of the Declaration of Homestead
and Schedule A that she viewed the property as her home and intended
to occupy it as such.89 Despite the ambiguity of the homestead statute,
83. Id.
84. In re Rodrigues, No. 09-11960-JNF, 2010 WL 716192, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb.
23, 2010).
85. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *6.
89. Id. See In re Szwyd, 370 B.R. 882, 890-91 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007). The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel, Kornreich, J., held that: (1) regardless of whether chapter 7 debtor, as
beneficiary of nominee trust, would have been eligible under Massachusetts law to claim
homestead exemption in real property owned by trust, his eligibility was established once he
became sole trustee and sole beneficiary, and legal and equitable title merged in same
individual, and (2) debtor’s declaration of homestead sufficiently manifested design by debtor
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the court held the debtor was entitled to the homestead exemption in this
specific set of circumstances, but was silent on how it would rule on
different types of trust ownership.90 Its holding was limited to the
specific trust instrument specified in the Rodrigues case, and not to all
trusts. As such, many believe this case actually raised more questions
about trust homestead protection than it answered.
G. Defining the Extent of Family Protection Under the Old Homestead
Statute
In another interesting and important decision, the court was forced
to determine how far the homestead protection extended to family
members.91 This is important because the old homestead statute was
ambiguous in regards to this issue. Specifically, in the In re Vasques
case, the debtor’s parents conveyed the property to him and his wife as
tenants in common, but reserved a life estate for themselves.92 The
debtor’s mother then recorded a homestead, on which the debtor relied
when he filed his chapter 7 bankruptcy.93 The trustee then objected to
the exemption claim on three grounds as follows: (1) the debtor did not
adequately reside at the property as of the date of filing; (2) the
homestead only reached the mother’s life estate, and not the debtor’s
tenancy in common, which could only be protected by the debtor’s
separate homestead Declaration; and (3) for homestead purposes, the
mother’s “family” protected by the homestead was comprised of parents,
and did not include adult children.94
In its analysis, the court indicated that two key sections of the
homestead statute were implicated: first, the section regarding
acquisition, and second, the continuance section.95 The acquisition
section reads in pertinent part as follows:
An estate of homestead to the extent of $500,000 in the land and
buildings may be acquired . . . by an owner or owners of a home or
one or all who rightfully possess the premise by lease or otherwise
and who occupy or intend to occupy said home as a principal
residence . . . . [A]n owner of a home shall include a sole owner,
joint tenant, tenant by the entirety or tenant in common; provided,
to acquire homestead as owner because of his beneficial interest and not simply to protect his
beneficial interest in trust. Id. at 891.
90. Id.
91. In re Vasques, 337 B.R. 255, 257 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006).
92. Id. at 256.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 257-58.
95. Id. at 258-59.
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that only one owner may acquire an estate of homestead in any such
home for the benefit of his family; and provided further, that an
estate of homestead may be acquired on only one principal residence
for the benefit of a family. For the purposes of this chapter, the word
“family” shall include either a parent and child or children, a
96
husband and wife with their children, if any, or a sole owner.

The continuance section of the homestead statute reads in pertinent
part as follows:
The estate of homestead existing at the death of a person holding a
homestead shall continue for the benefit of the surviving spouse and
minor children and shall be held and enjoyed by them . . . until the
youngest unmarried child is eighteen and until the marriage or death
97
of the spouse . . . .

The trustee argued that family membership for homestead purposes
ended after the declarant’s death upon the majority of the youngest
minor child.98 Thus, the claim was that “Section One homestead
protection is not available to an adult child of a living declarant where
both principally reside in the family home.”99 Accordingly, the trustee
claimed a “preference” in the homestead statute that existed for minor
children only.100 After reviewing the statute, the court was unable to
locate such a preference.101 Instead, the court noticed that section 1
extended the homestead benefits to members of a family, and then
defined family to include “a husband and a wife and their children.”102
The court recognized that section 1 contained no limitation whatsoever
on the definition of children.103 “The Trustee’s attempt to export the
minor child limitation from Section Four (the continuance section) into
the family definition in Section One (the acquisition section) is barred
by the plain and explicit text of the latter section.”104

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2004) (amended 2011).
Id. § 4
In re Vasques, 337 B.R. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259 (emphasis in original).
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III. CHANGES UNDER THE NEW HOMESTEAD ACT—FIXING
AMBIGUITIES?
On December 16, 2010, Massachusetts Governor Deval L. Patrick
signed Senate Bill 2406, entitled “An Act Relative to the Estate of
Homestead” (Act), which was a significant overhaul of the
Massachusetts homestead law.105 Although the statute will still be
known as Massachusetts General Laws chapter 188, the substantive
provisions are much improved, and for the most part, clearer. The new
law became effective on March 16, 2011, and replaced the old
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 188.106
In general, one of the most important changes under the new law is
automatic protection.107 Specifically, prior to the Act, it was required
that all Massachusetts homeowners formally record a Declaration of
Homestead in the Registry of Deeds—or reserve a homestead in a
recorded deed—in order to receive homestead protection.108 Through
inadvertence or mistake, this requirement has posed significant issues for
some homeowners who erroneously thought they had a valid homestead,
when in fact they did not, as one was never recorded or was
unintentionally extinguished. Statutory changes are highlighted in the
following sections.
A. Benefit of $500,000 Homestead by Recording (Section 4)
The Act now provides for automatic homestead protection (1) for
the benefit of the owner and family; (2) up to $125,000; (3) upon
acquisition; (4) of a principal residence occupied or intended to be
occupied as a home.109 If a resident already owns a home with a valid
Declaration of Homestead on record, the Act states that “[a]ll existing
estates of homestead . . . shall continue in full force and effect” up to the
full value of $500,000.110 The new automatic homestead provision
provides a huge benefit to home owning debtors as it protects against a
creditor’s ability to take away a debtor’s home based on technical error
with his or her recorded homestead, as the debtor can still fall back on

105. Jenifer B. Mckim, New Law Clarifies Mass. Homestead Protections, THE BOSTON
GLOBE (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2010/
12/18/new_law_clarifies_mass_homestead_protections/.
106. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, §§ 1-14 (2011).
107. Id. § 4.
108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2004) (amended 2011).
109. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011).
110. An Act Relative to the Estate of Homestead, ch. 395, § 3, 2010 Mass. Acts. 1380.
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the $125,000 automatic protection.111 Now, as long as the above four
requirements are met, the debtor still has the protections bestowed by the
automatic homestead—albeit a smaller benefit than a recorded
homestead—even if his or her recorded homestead is somehow
invalidated. It is important to note that although deemed “automatic,”
this homestead can still be challenged if a creditor or trustee can prove
the debtor is not occupying—or intending to occupy—the home as a
principal residence. The Act now clearly provides coverage to
individuals, tenants in common, joint tenants, tenants by the entirety,
and trust beneficiaries.112
The ability to clearly protect trust
beneficiaries is an important change when compared to the old
homestead law; however, it is important to note that protection is not
extended to the trustee. From a creditor’s standpoint, this provision may
also pose a problem as most trust beneficiaries are not public record, and
therefore, the creditor is at a disadvantage because it is not able to
confirm the validity of homestead holder by confirming ownership with
a quick search of the Registry of Deeds.
B. Benefit of $500,000 Homestead by Recording (Section 2)
Although homeowners now have the benefit of automatic
homestead protection, in order to get the full benefit of the Act, it is
suggested that a Declaration of Homestead still be filed in the Registry
of Deeds. By recording a valid Declaration of Homestead, which now
must also be notarized, the protection increases from the $125,000 that is
automatically allocated to $500,000.113 Specifically, the law states that
any owner(s) may acquire $500,000 of protection by Declaration if in
writing, recorded, signed by each owner to be “benefited” and
acknowledged.114 This allows two spouses to protect two homes if
111. See generally Shamban v. Masidlover, 705 N.E.2d 1136 (Mass. 1999); Dwyer v.
Cempellin, 673 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. 1996).
112. The Act states the following about multiple owners:
[W]ith respect to a home owned as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety, the
automatic homestead exemption shall remain whole and unallocated between the
owners, provided that the owners together shall not be entitled to an automatic
homestead exemption in excess of $125,000; and (2) with respect to a home owned
by multiple owners as tenants in common or as trust beneficiaries, the automatic
homestead exemption shall be allocated among all owners in proportion to their
respective ownership interests.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011). As such, if a husband and wife own a home as tenants
by the entirety and are relying on the automatic homestead, and the wife’s creditors cover
$125,000 in equity, the husband has no homestead coverage. Id.
113. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011).
114. Id. It is important to note that there is no longer any ability to reserve a homestead
in a deed as was available in the prior Homestead Act. Instead, the new law mandates
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separated. Unlike the old homestead law in which only one spouse
could claim a homestead on behalf of the family, the Act now permits
both spouses to file their own homesteads.115 In addition, if the
homeowners record a second homestead, the new law clarifies that the
new recording relates back to the filing of the first homestead, thus
closing a gap in the old law that discouraged some homeowners from
filing a new homestead for fear of terminating all protection provided as
of the date of the recording of the first homestead.116 Specifically,
section 1 of the old Massachusetts General Laws chapter 188 states in
part as follows:
Said [homestead] estate shall be exempt from the laws of
conveyance, descent, devise, attachment, levy on execution and sale
for payment of debts or legacies except in the following cases:
(1) sale for taxes;
(2) for a debt contracted prior to the acquisition of said estate of
117
homestead . . . .

Therefore, if someone recorded a homestead in 2000, and then
contracted for a debt in 2001, the 2000 homestead would protect the
homeowner against any claim by the 2001 creditor. Pursuant to the old
statutory language of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 188, section
1, a problem would have arisen if the homeowner recorded a new
homestead in 2002. Specifically, the statute was silent on whether the
2002 homestead would relate back to the original 2000 filing and thus
provide protection against the 2001 creditor, or whether the 2002 filing
would be considered a new homestead recording, thus exposing the
homeowner to liability for the 2001 debt, which could be deemed preexisting.
C. Elderly/Disabled (Section 2)
Elderly or disabled people are still able to declare an
elderly/disabled homestead by filing a Declaration.118 Because a
homestead protects spouses, an interesting issue arises if one spouse is
elderly and the other is not. Looking to resolve the issue addressed in In

creation of the $500,000 homestead by recording a separate instrument. Id. § 5.
115. Id. § 3.
116. Id. § 4.
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2004) (amended 2011).
118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 2 (2011). An elderly person is defined as someone
age 62 or older. Id. § 1. A disabled person is defined as a person “who has a medicallydeterminable, permanent physical or mental impairment” that meets the requirements for
Supplemental Security Income. Id.
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re Garran,119 under the Act, a mathematical equation resolves this issue
by multiplying the number of spouses eligible for protection under the
elderly/disabled homestead plus $250,000 (i.e., if both are eligible for
the elderly/disabled homestead, the total protection is $500,000 x 2 plus
$250,000=$1,250,000; and if one spouse is eligible for elderly/disabled
protection and the other is not, the total protection is $500,000 plus
$250,000=$750,000).120
The termination of an elderly/disabled
homestead is accomplished by sale, release, new Declaration in new
home, or abandonment.121 One potentially unresolved issue is the effect
of a reverse mortgage and whether it is abandonment.
D. Protection (Section 3)
Pursuant to section 3 of the Act, a valid homestead protects real
estate from attachment, levy, seizure, and execution on judgment except:
(1) for a sale for federal, state and local taxes, assessments, claims
and liens; (2) for a lien on the home recorded prior to the creation of
the estate of homestead; (3) for a mortgage on the home . . . ; (4)
upon an order by a court that a spouse, former spouse or parent shall
pay a certain amount weekly or otherwise for the support of a
spouse, former spouse or minor children; (5) where buildings on
land not owned by the owner of the estate of homestead are attached,
levied upon or sold for the ground rent of the lot upon which they are
situated; and (6) upon an execution issued from a court of competent
jurisdiction to enforce its judgment based upon fraud, mistake,
122
duress, undue influence or lack of capacity.

Special rules apply to mortgages.123
Responding to In re Desroches,124 the homestead is statutorily
subordinated to the mortgage if executed by all owners of home.125 The
subordination does not require the signature of a spouse who is not an
owner.126 “A mortgage executed by fewer than all of the owners of a
home that is subject to an estate of homestead shall be superior only to
the homestead estate of the owners who are parties to the mortgage and

119. 338 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003). See supra section II.D (examining the uncertainty of
whether co-owners could “stack” homestead exemptions).
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011).
121. Id. § 2.
122. Id. § 3.
123. Id.
124. 314 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
125. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 9 (2011).
126. Id.
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their non-titled spouses and minor children, if any.”127 In addition, a
mortgage does not need recitation of subordination of homestead, and a
mortgage lender cannot require a release of homestead in connection
with the mortgage.128
E. Special Trust Issues
Responding to the decision in In re Rodrigues,129 the beneficiaries
of a trust must file for homestead protection, as the full $500,000
exemption is not automatic.130 Although the identity of the beneficiaries
in a trust are typically not made public under trust law, in order to obtain
protection under the Act, the beneficiaries must be disclosed in the
Declaration of Homestead. This requirement also poses significant
questions regarding the effect of a homestead: if there is a change of
beneficiary, if one beneficiary moves out, or is a minor, is the homestead
abandoned?131
Regarding multiple beneficiaries, in determining the percentage of
homestead protection for trust beneficiaries, the new Act states that:
if a home is owned by tenants in common or trust beneficiaries, the
declared homestead exemption for each co-tenant and trust
beneficiary who benefits by an estate of homestead declared
pursuant to said section 3 shall be the product of: (i) $500,000; and
(ii) the co-tenant’s or trust beneficiary’s percentage ownership
132
interest.

F.

Release/Termination (Section 10)

Under the new Act, the homestead can be terminated by a deed
signed by the owner(s) and non-owner spouse or former spouse to a nonfamily member.133 Absent express language, deeds between spouses,
life tenants, remaindermen, trustees, and beneficiaries do not terminate
homestead protection. This is an important distinction, as prior to the
Act, it had been held that any transfer—including intra-family
transfers—without reservation would terminate the homestead, even
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. No. 09-11960-JNF, 2010 WL 716142 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2010).
130. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, §§ 1, 5 (2011).
131. A “minor child” is “a person aged 21 and under, who is the natural or adopted
child of an owner or owner’s spouse entitled to the benefits of this chapter, notwithstanding
any law to the contrary.” Id. § 1.
132. Id. § 1.
133. Id. § 10(a).
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when it was very unlikely that the intent of the grantor was to do the
same.134 Other ways to terminate a homestead include (1) a written
termination signed by owner(s) and non-owner spouse or former spouse;
(2) abandonment as principal resident; and (3) recording of a new
Declaration.135 If the home is owned by a trust, the homestead can be
terminated by (1) a release or termination signed by the trustee; (2) a
release or terminations signed by the beneficiary; or (3) abandonment by
the beneficiary.136
G. Multiple Owners
The new act clarifies that, although multiple owners of a principal
residence may benefit from homestead protection, the aggregate
protection is limited to the $500,000 homestead amount.137 However, in
the case of a married couple where both spouses can benefit from what
is known as an elder and disabled homestead, the aggregate protection
for the principal residence may be increased to $1,000,000 of equity.138
In the case of non-married co-owners of a principal residence, e.g.
sibling co-owners, who all file for the elderly or disabled homestead, the
aggregate protection is the product of $500,000 of equity multiplied by
the number of owners who qualify for the elderly or disabled
homestead.139
H. Family Transfers
The Act provides that the transfer of a principal residence between
family members does not terminate an existing homestead, even if the
new deed fails to reserve the homestead upon the transfer.140 In
addition, a homestead existing at the death or divorce of a person
holding a homestead shall continue for the benefit of his or her surviving
spouse or former spouse and minor children who occupy or intend to
occupy said home as a principal residence.141 However, any adult child
who has an ownership interest in the principal residence is required to
file his or her own homestead Declaration in order to have the increased
protection of the $500,000 amount.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See supra Part II.A.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 10(a) (2011).
Id. § 10(a)(4).
Id. § 1.
Id. §§ 1-2.
Id.
Id. § 10.
Id. § 7.
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Sales and Insurance Proceeds

The proceeds from the sale of a principal residence, or the
insurance proceeds from a principal residence that suffers a casualty
loss, are protected by the homestead in order to purchase a new principal
residence or repair a damaged one.142 The proceeds from a sale are
protected for the period of one year from the sale of the current principal
residence, but the insurance proceeds are protected for a two-year period
from receipt of the proceeds.143
J.

Mortgage Waiver of Homestead

Does a blanket waiver of a homestead in mortgage documents
terminate the protection of a homestead against all creditors? The Act
provides the sensible answer that a mortgage does not terminate a
previously filed homestead, but only subordinates the homestead to the
specific mortgage at issue.144
K. Which Spouse Files the Homestead?
Prior to the new Act, an issue arose regarding how to resolve the
question of which spouse should file the homestead. The legislature
chose a simple solution, as the Act requires both spouses who have an
ownership interest in the principal residence to sign the Declaration of
Homestead.145 In addition, the Declaration must identify each person
receiving homestead protection, including the name of a spouse who
may not be an owner.146 The Declaration must also state that each
person occupies, or intends to occupy, the property as his or her
principal residence.147
L. Closing Attorneys’ Obligations (Section 14)
In order to provide additional safeguards to homeowners, the
mortgagor must now provide notice of the right to declare homestead
exemption.148 In fact, the borrower must also sign the notice. The
statute is silent regarding the notice requirement for borrowers obtaining
a home equity loan; however, section 14 appears very broad and thus

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. § 11.
Id.
Id. § 9.
Id. § 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 14.
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likely applies.149
CONCLUSION
Although it appears the Act has rectified many of the
inconsistencies that existed under the old homestead law, only time will
tell if the Act actually produces reliable and consistent results that
benefit Massachusetts’s homeowners. The Act may not be viewed
favorably by creditors and bankruptcy trustees as it further limits their
ability to liquidate a debtor’s house; however, it appears the
Massachusetts legislature made a conscious decision to protect residents
and ensure that despite troubled finances, homelessness should not be
added to a debtor’s list of financial woes. Further, the new Act
encourages the overall public policy, which dictates that exemption
laws, such as homestead provisions, should be liberally construed to
comport with their beneficent spirit of protecting the family home.150

149. Id.
150. See Dwyer v. Cempellin, 673 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Mass. 1996).
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APPENDIX: 50 STATE SURVEY OF HOMESTEAD PROTECTIONS
To understand the diversity of homestead statutes in the
United States, a survey of the various protections can be
summarized as follows:
Alabama: Up to $5,000 in value, or up to 160 acres in area. ALA.
CODE § 6-10-2 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Alaska: Up to $54,000, no area limitation. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
09.38.010 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Arizona: Up to $150,000, no area limitation. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1101 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Arkansas: Up to $2,500 in value, or at least 1/4 acre for city
homesteads, 80 acres for rural homesteads. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-66210, -218 (West, Westlaw 2012).
California: At least $75,000 in value. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
704.730 (West, Westlaw 2013).
Colorado: Up to $90,000 in value, no area limitation. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 38-41-201 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Connecticut: $75,000. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352b (2012).
Delaware: None provided. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4901 - 03
(West, Westlaw 2010).
District of Columbia: D.C. provides an exemption equal to owner’s
aggregate interest in real property (no monetary or area limitations).
D.C. CODE § 15-501(a)(14) (West, Westlaw 2012). D.C. does not call
this a homestead exemption.
Florida: Exemption equal to value of property as assessed for tax
purposes (no monetary limitations); area limitations of 1/2 acre urban
land or 160 acres rural land. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
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Georgia: Up to $5,000 in value, no area limitation. GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-13-1, -100 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Hawaii: Up to $20,000, but the head of a family and persons sixtyfive years of age or older are allowed up to $30,000, no area limitation.
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 651-91, -92 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Idaho: Up to $100,000 in value, no area limitation. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 55-1003 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Illinois: Up to $15,000 in value, no area limitation. Where multiple
owners, can be increased to $30,000 but each individual is limited to a
share correlating to the percentage of ownership. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5 / 12-901 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Indiana: Up to $1,500 for residence, up to $8,000 for additional
property, no area limitation. Co-owner, if also a joint debtor, may claim
additional $7,500. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-55-10-2 (West, Westlaw
2012).
Iowa: No monetary limitation, but a minimum value of $500. Area
limitations of 1/2 acre urban land or 40 acres rural land. IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 561.2, .16 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Kansas: No monetary limitation. Area limitations of one acre urban
land or 160 acres rural land. KAN. CONST. art. XIV, § 9; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-2301 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Kentucky: Up to $5,000 in value, no area limitation. KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 427.060 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Louisiana: Up to $35,000, but may include entirety of property in
cases of catastrophic or terminal illness or injury. Area limitations of
five acres urban land or 200 acres rural land. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
20:1 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Maine: Up to $47,500 in value, but may be up to $60,000 under
certain circumstances, no area limitation. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 4422 (West, Westlaw 2011).
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Maryland: Up to $6,000, but in Title XI bankruptcy proceedings, up
to $5,000, no area limitation. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11504 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Massachusetts: Up to $500,000 in value, no area limitation. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011).
Michigan: Up to $3,500 in value. Area limitations of one acre
urban land or 40 acres rural land. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6023
(West, Westlaw 2012).
Minnesota: Up to $300,000 in value, but up to $750,000 if used
primarily for agricultural purposes. Area limitations of 1/2 acre urban
land or 160 acres rural land. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (West,
Westlaw 2012).
Mississippi: Up to $75,000 in value. Area limitation of 160 acres.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-21 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Missouri: Up to $15,000 in value, no area limitation. MO. ANN.
STAT. § 513.475 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Montana: Up to $250,000 in value, no area limitation. MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 70-32-101, -104, -201 (West, Westlaw 2011).
Nebraska: Up to $60,000 in value. Area limitation of two lots,
urban land or 160 acres rural land. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-101
(West, Westlaw 2012).
Nevada: Up to $550,000 in equity, no area limitation. NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 115.010 (West, Westlaw 2011).
New Hampshire: Up to $100,000 in value, no area limitation. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:1 (West, Westlaw 2013).
New Jersey: No homestead exemption is provided, but an
exemption for personal property of up to $1,000 is allowed. N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:17-1, -17 (West, Westlaw 2012).
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New Mexico: Up to $60,000 in value, no area limitation. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 2-10-9 (West, Westlaw 2012).
New York: Up to $150,000 above liens and encumbrances in value,
no area limitation. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206 (MCKINNEY 2012).
North Carolina: Up to $35,000 in value, no area limitation. N.C.
CONST. art X, § 2; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1C-1601 (West, Westlaw
2012).
North Dakota: Up to $100,000 in value, no area limitation. N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-18-01 (West, Westlaw 2011).
Ohio: Up to $20,200 in value, no area limitation. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2329.66 (West, Westlaw 2011).
Oklahoma: Unlimited in value; area limitations of one acre urban
land or 160 acres rural land. However, where using more than 25% of
property for business purpose, the value drops to $5,000. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1, 2 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Oregon: Up to $40,000 in value; area limitations of one city block
if within a city or 160 acres rural land. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.240
(West, Westlaw 2012).
Pennsylvania: No homestead exemption provided, but a general
monetary exemption of $300 exists. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 81218123 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Rhode Island: Up to $500,000 in value, no area limitation. R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-26-4.1 (West, Westlaw 2012).
South Carolina: Although no homestead exemption is provided, an
exemption for personal and real property of up to $50,000 in value may
include property claimed as a residence. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30
(West, Westlaw 2012).
South Dakota: No monetary limitation; area limitation of one
dwelling house and contiguous lots used in good faith. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 43-31-1 to -3 (West, Westlaw 2012).
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Tennessee: Up to $5,000, but may be up to $7,500 if claimed by
two persons as a homestead, no area limitation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 262-301 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Texas: No monetary limitation; area limitation of ten acres urban
land or 100 acres of rural land if claimed by a single person. A family
may claim 200 acres of rural land. TEX. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 50-51;
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001, .002 (West, Westlaw 2011).
Utah: Up to $20,000 in value, but only $5,000 in value if property
is not primary residence. Area limitation of one acre. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-5-503 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Vermont: Up to $125,000 in value, no area limitation. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Virginia: Up to $5,000, but may be increased by $500 for each
dependent residing on the property, no area limitation. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Washington: Generally, up to $125,000 in value, but may be
unlimited if used against income taxes on retirement plan benefits, no
area limitation. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.030 (Westlaw 2012).
West Virginia: Up to $5,000 in value, but an additional $7,500 may
be available in cases of “catastrophic illness or injury,” no area
limitation. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-9-1, -10-4 (West, Westlaw 2012).
Wisconsin: Up to $75,000 in value, no area limitation. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 815.20 (West, Westlaw 2011).
Wyoming: Up to $20,000 in value, each co-owner is entitled to a
homestead exemption. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-101 (West, Westlaw
2012).

